Here is the final report of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission into the causes of the global financial crisis of 2007-2009. Two thorough Dissenting Statements accompany the final report. The report is a chronological compendium of the review of millions of pages of documents, the interviews of hundreds of leaders, CxOs, financial experts and academics, as well as common people, home- and business-owners who were also significantly affected by the financial meltdown. - Summary by Mario Pineda
Chapters
1
Preface Read by Joanne Turner 8:03
2
Conclusions of the Commission, concluded Read by Joanne Turner 22:59
3
Ch. 1. Before Our Very Eyes, part 1 Read by Joanne Turner 38:26
4
Ch. 1. Before Our Very Eyes, part 2 Read by Joanne Turner 45:54
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Ch. 1. Before Our Very Eyes, part 3 Read by Joanne Turner 17:57
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Ch. 2. Shadow Banking: Commercial Paper and Repos Read by Joanne Turner 30:09
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Ch. 2. Shadow Banking: The Savings and Loan Crisis Read by Joanne Turner 18:16
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Ch. 3. Securitization and Derivatives: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Read by Joanne Turner 20:26
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Ch. 3. Securitization and Derivatives: Structured Finance Read by Joanne Turner 12:11
10
Ch. 3. Securitization and Derivatives: The Growth of Derivatives Read by Joanne Turner 25:53
11
Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: Expansion of Banking Activities Read by Joanne Turner 19:24
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Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: Long-Term Capital Management Read by Joanne Turner 12:00
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Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: Dot-Com Crash Read by Joanne Turner 12:11
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Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: The Wages of Finance Read by Joanne Turner 13:26
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Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: Financial Sector Growth Read by Joanne Turner 8:47
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Ch. 5. Subprime Lending: Mortgage Securitization Read by Joanne Turner 17:04
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Ch. 5. Subprime Lending: Greater Access to Lending Read by Joanne Turner 6:19
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Ch. 5. Subprime Lending: Subprime Lenders in Turmoil Read by Joanne Turner 5:33
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Ch. 5. Subprime Lending: The Regulators Read by Joanne Turner 19:20
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Ch. 6. Credit Expansion: Housing, A Powerful Stabilizing Force Read by Joanne Turner 19:39
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Ch. 6. Credit Expansion: Subprime Loans, Buyers Will Pay A Premium Read by Joanne Turner 18:12
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Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. Citigroup: Invited Regulatory Scrutiny Read by Joanne Turner 4:42
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Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. Federal Rules: Intended to Curb Unfair or Abusive Lending Read by Joanne Turner 12:52
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Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. States: Long-Standing Position Read by Joanne Turner 4:02
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Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. Community-Lending Pledges: What We Do Is Reaffirm Our Intention" Read by Joanne Turner 10:44
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Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. Bank Capital Standards: "Arbitrage" Read by Joanne Turner 5:45
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Ch. 6. Commission Conclusions on Chapter 6 Read by Joanne Turner 1:18
28
Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. An Irresistible Profit Opportunity Read by Joanne Turner 10:21
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Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Mortgages: A Good Loan Read by Joanne Turner 32:56
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Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Federal Regulators: Immunity from Many State Laws is a Significant Benefit Read by Joanne Turner 6:49
31
Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Wall Street Was Very Hungry For Our Product Read by Joanne Turner 17:23
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Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Moody's: Given A Blank Check Read by Joanne Turner 16:09
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Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Less Competition in the Marketplace Read by Joanne Turner 13:09
34
Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Commission Conclusions on Chapter 7 Read by Joanne Turner 3:24
35
Ch. 8. The CDO Machine Read by Joanne Turner 7:50
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Ch. 8. We Created the Investor Read by Joanne Turner 22:21
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Ch. 8. Bear Stearns' Hedge Funds: It Functioned Fine Up Until One Day It Just Didn't Function Read by Joanne Turner 10:33
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Ch. 8. Citigroup's Liquidity puts: A Potential Conflict of Interest Read by Joanne Turner 10:51
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Ch. 8. AIG:Golden Goose for the Entire Street Read by Joanne Turner 10:28
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Ch. 8. Goldman Sachs: Multiplied the Effects of the Collapse in Subprime Read by Joanne Turner 17:16
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Ch. 8. Moody's: Achieved Through Some Alchemy Read by Joanne Turner 18:33
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Ch. 8. SEC: It's Going to be an Awfully Big Mess Read by Joanne Turner 19:27
43
Commission Conclusions on Chapter 8 Read by Joanne Turner 2:55
44
Chapter 9. The Bubble, "A Credit-induced Boom" Read by Joanne Turner 15:00
45
Mortgage Fraud: Crime-facilitative environments Read by Joanne Turner 22:31
46
Disclosure and due diligence: A Quality Control Issue in the Factory Read by Joanne Turner 24:27
47
Regulators: markets will always self-correct Read by Joanne Turner 14:56
48
Leveraged Loans and Commercial Real Estate: You've Got to Get Up and Dance Read by Joanne Turner 11:08
49
Lehman: From Moving to Storage Read by Joanne Turner 7:47
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Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Two Stark Choices Read by Joanne Turner 11:36
51
2006: Increase Our Penetration into Subprime. 2007: Moving deeper into the credit pool Read by Joanne Turner 12:30
52
Affordable housing goals: "GSEs cried bloody murder forever." The impact of the goals Read by Joanne Turner 17:05
53
Commission Conclusions on Chapter 9 Read by Joanne Turner 1:39
54
Ch. 10. CDO Managers: "We Are Not A Rent-A-Manager" Read by Joanne Turner 9:52
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Ch. 10. Credit Default Swaps: "Dumb Question" Read by Joanne Turner 24:17
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Citigroup: "I Do Not Believe We Were Powerless" Read by Joanne Turner 18:04
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AIG: "I'm Not Getting Paid Enough to Stand on These Tracks" Read by Joanne Turner 8:42
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Merrill Lynch: "Whatever It Takes" Read by Joanne Turner 12:28
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Regulators: "Are Undue Concentrations of Risk Developing?" Read by Joanne Turner 7:29
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Moody's: "It Was All About Revenue" Read by Joanne Turner 23:34
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Commission Conclusions on Chapter 10 Read by Joanne Turner 2:20
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Ch. 11. The Bust. Delinquencies: "The Turn of the Housing Market" Read by Joanne Turner 29:56
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Ch. 11. Rating Downgrades: "Never Before" Read by Joanne Turner 8:04
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Ch. 11. CDOs: "Climbing the Wall of Subprime Lending" Read by Joanne Turner 4:50
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Ch. 11. Legal Remedies: "On the Basis of the Information" Read by Joanne Turner 10:10
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Ch. 11. Losses: "Who Owns Residential Credit Risk?" Read by Joanne Turner 13:22
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Commission Conclusions on Ch. 11 Read by Joanne Turner 2:33
68
Early 2007: Spreading Subprime Worries Read by Joanne Turner 7:02
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Ch. 12. Goldman: Let's be Aggressive Read by Joanne Turner 13:59
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Bear Stearns's Hedge Funds Read by Joanne Turner 16:01
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Rating Agencies Read by Joanne Turner 4:27
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AIG: Well Bigger Read by Joanne Turner 7:39
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Commission Conclusions on Ch. 12 Read by Joanne Turner 0:56
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Chapter 13 Summer 2007: Disruptions in Funding Intro Read by Cbteddy 2:06
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Ch 13 IKB of Germany "Real Money Investors" Read by Cbteddy 5:42
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Ch 13 Countrywide: "That's our 9/11" Read by Cbteddy 8:29
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Ch 13 BNP Paribas: "The ringing of the bells" Read by Cbteddy 4:40
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Ch 13 SIVs: "An Oasis of Calm" Read by Cbteddy 4:04
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Ch 13 Money funds and other investors: "Drink[ing] from a fire hose" Read by Cbteddy 6:19
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Commission conclusions on Chapter 13 Read by Cbteddy 1:39
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Chapter 14 Late 2007 to early 2008: Billions in subprime losses (Intro) Read by mpinedag 2:42
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Ch 14 Merrill Lynch: "Dawining awareness over the course of the summer" Read by mpinedag 11:50
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Ch 14 Citigroup: "That would not in any way have excited my attention" Read by mpinedag 22:26
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Ch 14 AIG's dispute with Goldman: "There could never be losses" Read by mpinedag 32:30
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Ch 14 Federal Reserve: "The discount window wasn't working" Read by mpinedag 7:47
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Ch 14 Monoline Insurers: "We never expected losses" Read by mpinedag 9:16
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Commission Conclusions on Chapter 14 Read by mpinedag 1:15
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Chapter 15 March 2008: The fall of Bear Stearns (Intro) Read by Cbteddy 3:48
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Ch 15 "I requested some forbearance" Read by Cbteddy 4:06
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Ch 15 "We were suitably skeptical" Read by Cbteddy 3:56
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Ch 15 "Turn into a death spiral" Read by Cbteddy 9:15
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Ch 15 "Duty to protect their investors" Read by Cbteddy 11:06
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Ch 15 "The Government would not permit a higher number" Read by Cbteddy 4:42
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Ch 15 "It was heading to a black hole" Read by Cbteddy 2:49
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Commission Conclusions on Chapter 15 Read by Cbteddy 1:16
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Chapter 16 March to August 2008: Systemic Risk Concerns (Intro) Read by mpinedag 2:38
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Ch 16 The Federal Reserve: "When people got scared" Read by mpinedag 8:36
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Ch 16 JP Morgan: "Refusing to unwind...would be unforgiveable" Read by mpinedag 5:16
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Ch 16 The Fed and the SEC: "Weak liquidity position" Read by mpinedag 7:39
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Ch 16 Derivatives: "Early stages of assessing the potential systemic risk" Read by mpinedag 7:12
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Ch 16 Banks: "The markets were really, really dicey" Read by mpinedag 26:35
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Commission Conclusions on Chapter 16 Read by mpinedag 1:19
103
Chapter 17 September 2008: The takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Intro) Read by Cbteddy 3:28
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Ch 17 "A good time to buy" Read by Cbteddy 5:04
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Ch 17 "The only game in town" Read by Cbteddy 3:30
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Ch 17 "It's a time game...be cool" Read by Cbteddy 6:38
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Ch 17 "The idea strikes me as perverse" Read by Cbteddy 3:58
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Ch 17 "It will increase confidence" Read by Cbteddy 8:45
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Ch 17 "Critical unsafe and unsound practices" Read by Cbteddy 6:22
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Ch 17 "They went from zero to three with no warning in between" Read by Cbteddy 7:31
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Ch 17 "The worst-run financial institution" Read by Cbteddy 3:37
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Ch 17 "Wasn't done at my pay grade" Read by Cbteddy 1:16
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Commission Conclusions on Chapter 17 Read by Cbteddy 2:26
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Chapter 18 September 2008: The bankruptcy of Lehman (Intro) Read by mpinedag 4:37
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Ch 18 "Get more conservatively funded" Read by mpinedag 7:17
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Ch 18 "This is not sounding good at all" Read by mpinedag 3:38
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Ch 18 "Spook the market" Read by mpinedag 11:07
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Ch 18 "Imagination hat" Read by mpinedag 8:19
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Ch 18 "Heads of family" Read by mpinedag 3:38
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Ch 18 "Tell those sons of bitches to unwind" Read by mpinedag 3:20
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Ch 18 "This doesn't seem like it is going to end pretty" Read by mpinedag 8:02
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Ch 18 "The only alternative was that Lehman had to fail" Read by mpinedag 3:48
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Ch 18 "A calamity" Read by mpinedag 12:42
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Commission Conclusions on Chapter 18 Read by mpinedag 2:30
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Chapter 19 September 2008: The bailout of AIG (Intro) Read by Cbteddy 5:14
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Ch 19 "Current liquidity position is precarious" Read by Cbteddy 6:56
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Ch 19 "Spillover effect" Read by Cbteddy 10:50
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Ch 19 "Like a gnat on an elephant" Read by Cbteddy 5:18
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Commission Conclusions on Chapter 19 Read by Cbteddy 3:07
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Chapter 20 Crisis and Panic (Intro) Read by mpinedag 7:45
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Ch 20 Money market funds: "Dealers weren't even picking up their phones" Read by mpinedag 10:36
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Ch 20 Morgan Stanley: "Now we're the next in line" Read by mpinedag 13:07
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Ch 20 Over-the-counter derivatives "A grinding halt" Read by mpinedag 6:26
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Ch 20 Washington Mutual "It's yours" Read by mpinedag 4:16
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Ch 20 Wachovia "At the front end of teh dominoes as other dominoes fell" Read by mpinedag 18:26
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Ch 20 TARP "Comprehensive approach" Read by mpinedag 18:03
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Ch 20 AIG "We needed to stop the sucking chest wound in this patient" Read by mpinedag 10:19
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Ch 20 Citigroup "Let the world know we will not pull a Lehman" Read by mpinedag 11:15
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Ch 20 Bank of America "A shotgun wedding" Read by mpinedag 13:17
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Commission Conclusions on Chapter 20 Read by mpinedag 2:45
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Chapter 21 The Economic Fallout (Intro) Read by Cbteddy 4:17
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Ch 21 Households "I'm not eating, I'm not sleeping" Read by Cbteddy 12:15
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Ch 21 Businesses "Squirrels storing nuts" Read by Cbteddy 9:54
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Ch 21 Commercial real estate: "Nothing's moving" Read by Cbteddy 5:09
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Ch 21 Government: "State struggled to close shortfalls" Read by Cbteddy 8:06
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Ch 21 The financial sector: "Almost triple the level of three years earlier" Read by Cbteddy 3:18
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Ch 22 Foreclosures on the rise: "Hard to talk about any recovery" Read by mpinedag 6:39
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Ch 22 Initiatives to stem foreclosures "Persistently disregard" Read by mpinedag 6:37
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Ch 22 Flaws in the process: "Speculation and worst-case scenarios" Read by mpinedag 5:39
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Ch 22 Neighborhood effects: "I'm not leaving" Read by mpinedag 5:26
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Commission Conclusions on Chapter 22 Read by mpinedag 1:01
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Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Intro Read by Cbteddy 1:19
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Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - How our approach differs from others? Read by Cbteddy 7:09
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Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Stages of the crisis Read by Cbteddy 2:26
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Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The ten essential causes of the financial and economic crisis Read by Cbteddy 6:10
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Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The credit bubble: global capita flows, underpriced risk, and Federal Reserve policy Read by Cbteddy 8:30
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Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The housing bubble Read by Cbteddy 8:35
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Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Turning bad mortgages into toxic financial assets Read by Cbteddy 7:28
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Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Big bank bets and why banks failed Read by Cbteddy 9:32
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Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Two types of systemic failure Read by Cbteddy 13:52
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Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The shock and panic Read by Cbteddy 6:39
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Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The system freezing Read by Cbteddy 3:50
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Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - Intro Read by mpinedag 23:30
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Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - Summary Read by mpinedag 7:41
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Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 1. Government policies resulted in an unprecedented number of risky mortgages Read by mpinedag 15:59
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Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 2. The great housing bubble and its effects Read by mpinedag 13:03
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Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 3. Delinquency rates on nontraditional mortgages Read by mpinedag 4:20
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Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 4. The origin and growth of subprime PMBS Read by mpinedag 7:58
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Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 5. What was known about NTMs prior to the crisis? Read by mpinedag 17:17
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Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 6. Conclusion Read by mpinedag 4:40
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Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - II. How 27 million NTMS precipitated a financial crisis - Intro Read by Cbteddy 3:26
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Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - II. How 27 million NTMS precipitated a financial crisis - How failures among NTMs were transmitted to the financial system Read by Cbteddy 3:21
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Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - II. How 27 million NTMS precipitated a financial crisis - The defaults begin Read by Cbteddy 34:12
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Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - Intro Read by Cbteddy 9:00
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Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 1. HUD's central role Read by Cbteddy 7:34
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Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 2. The decline of mortgage underwriting standards Read by Cbteddy 35:58
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Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 3. The affordable housing goals were the sole reason that the GSEs' acquired so many NTMs, part 1 Read by mpinedag 27:41
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Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 3. The affordable housing goals were the sole reason that the GSEs' acquired so many NTMs, part 2 Read by mpinedag 28:32
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Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 4. Competition between the GSEs and FHA for subprime and alt-a mortgages Read by mpinedag 10:15
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Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 5. Enlisting mortgage bankers and subprime lenders in affordable housing Read by mpinedag 5:10
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Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 6. The community reinvestment act Read by mpinedag 22:13
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Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - IV. Conclusion Read by mpinedag 2:37
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